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Chapter 2
A NEW CRISIS MECHANISM
FOR THE EURO AREA
2.1 The European debt crisis
The European debt crisis followed the US financial
crisis with a delay of one and a half years. While its
first signs were visible in November and December of
2009 when the rating agency Fitch downgraded
Ireland and Greece, it culminated on 28 April 2010
when the intra-day interest rate for two-year Greek
government bonds peaked at 38 percent. Since then
capital markets have been extremely unstable, show-
ing signs of distrust in the creditworthiness of the
GIPS countries: Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain.
The European Union reacted by preparing volumi-
nous rescue plans that, at this writing (January 2011),
have been resorted to by Greece and Ireland. 
2.1.1 The rescue measures of
May 2010
Between 7 and 9 May 2010, the
EU countries agreed on an exten-
sive rescue package targeted on
fiscally distressed countries in the
euro area. At the same time, the
ECB, referring to Article 123
TFEU (Treaty on the Function-
ing of the European Union),
began to purchase government
bonds of distressed countries.
Table 2.1 presents an estimate of
total financial commitments,
including ECB interventions, dis-
entangling the amounts of liabil-
ities to be borne by Germany and
France, the two biggest guaran-
tors of the system. 
As part of the European Finan-
cial Stability Facility (EFSF),
which was set up as a special pur-
pose entity in Luxembourg, cred-
it aid is made available, outside
the EU regime, for up to a total of 440 billion euros.
Of this amount, Germany and France guarantee up
to 147.4 and 110.7 billion euros, respectively. The pre-
requisite is unanimity in the diagnosis of impending
insolvency among the aiding countries and the IMF. 
Under Article 122 TFEU (natural disaster para-
graph), additional loans for up to 60 billion euros may
be granted directly via the European Commission.
The German and French contributions to these loans
are also included in Table 2.1, on the basis of the con-
tributions by these countries to the total EU budget in
2009. 
In addition, the table accounts for the contributions
that Germany and France indirectly grant through the
IMF, in proportion to their respective ownership
shares. Germany, for example, contributes 6 percent
or 14.9 billion euros via this channel. Of the partly
disbursed loans to Greece, the country bears a share
Table 2.1




EFSF 440  147.4  110.7 
EFSM 60  11.3  11.1 
IMF aid (parallel to EFSM und
EFSF) 250  14.9  12.3 
EU aid Greece 80  22.3  16.8 
IMF aid Greece 30  1.8  1.5 
ECB government bond  
Purchases (14 January 2011) 76  20.7  15.5 
Total 936  218.5  167.9 
Notes: 1st line: ECB capital quotas (euro area without Greece), raised
by 20 percent. 2nd line: Share in EU budget 2009. 3rd line: current IMF
capital quota (5.98 percent for Germany and 4.94 percent for France).
4th line: ECB capital quota (euro area without Greece). 5th line: like 
line 3. 6th line: ECB capital share (euro area).
Sources: EFSF Framework Agreement, 7 June 2010, www.bundes-
finanzministerium.de, 5 July 2010; EU, The European Stabilization 
Mechanism, Council Regulation (EU) No. 407/2010 of 11 May 2010
establishing a European financial stabilisation mechanism, www.eur-
lex.europa.eu, 7 July 2010; European Commission, EU Budget, 2009
Financial Report (Luxembourg 2010), p. 62; ECB, 1 January 2009 – 
Adjustments to the ECB´s Capital Subscription Key and the Contribution 
Paid by Slovakia, Press release 1 January 2009; ECB, Consolidated
Record of the Eurosystem, several press releases, www.ecb.int; IMF,
Updated IMF Quota Data – June 2010, www.imf.org, 5 July 2010. Ifo
Institute calculations. 
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allel IMF aid for Greece, according to its IMF quota.
The corresponding shares for France are 21 percent
and 4.9 percent.
By the same token, these two countries participate in
the ECB government bond purchases, amounting to
76 billion euros, according to their respective quotas
in the ECB capital. These are potential liabilities, for
which, if the bonds end up not being serviced, the
ECB will suffer write-downs that will reduce the
seignorage dividends paid to the finance ministers of
the euro-area countries or force the ECB to demand a
capital increase. 
As a consequence of the decisions of the ECB and the
EU countries of 7 to 9 May 2010, by January 2011
Germany’s potential liabilities amounted to 218.5 bil-
lion euros and France’s liabilities to 167.9 billion
euros (out of 936 billion euros in total). 
As a special purpose entity, the life of the EFSF was
initially limited until 30 June 2013. Of course, loans
given before June 2013 could have been brought to
maturity, de facto extending the effects of the EFSF
beyond its initial statutory end-point (the maturity of
the EFSF loans is not officially restricted). However,
on 17 December the EU countries agreed to extend
the EFSF indefinitely under a new name and with
new governance rules and not to use the EFSM at all.
This will be discussed below in Section 2.5.2.1.
Similarly the activities by the ECB have no official
time-limit constraint. This will be discussed in
Section 2.6.2.
2.1.2 Interest spreads
The extensive rescue measures
were caused by rapidly rising
interest spreads on government
bonds, as shown in Figure 2.1.
This figure reports interest rates
on 10-year government bonds of
several euro-area countries
before and after the introduction
of the euro. It is evident that
interest rates were widely dis-
persed before the plan to create
the euro became completely cred-
ible, between 1996 and 1997, at
which point they converged
rapidly and sharply. Only after
2007, as a result of the financial
crisis, have they been again drifting apart, as can be
seen on the right-hand edge of the graph. In 1995, the
weighted average of the Spanish, Portuguese and
Italian bond rates were exactly 5 percent above the
German rate, because the buyers of these bonds want-
ed to be compensated for the combined risk of depre-
ciation and default. The convergence phase began
around 1996, when the Stability and Growth Pact was
agreed upon, and expectations grew that the euro was
imminent and the exchange rate risk would vanish.
During this phase, the vanishing depreciation risk was
associated with a vast underpricing of default risk.
This phase ended in autumn 2008, when after the
demise of Lehman Brothers, doubts about the credit-
worthiness of individual European countries
emerged.
Investors recognised that the euro did not (and could
not) guarantee that the interest payments promised to
investors would actually be paid in full by the debtors,
and started to revise their assessment of default risk
of bonds issued by different governments. In a well-
functioning capital market, of course, default risk
must be compensated for with an interest surcharge,
since the expected interest payment is below the rate
agreed in the loan contract, as a function of the prob-
ability and the size of default. 
The rescue actions agreed between 7 and 9 May 2010
were initially successful in reducing the interest spreads,
but their success was short-lived. The political and insti-
tutional context of the rescue could do nothing but feed
fundamental doubts about the credibility and the over-
all extent of the commitment by EU countries. In any
case, actions were limited to a three-year intervention
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horizon. Even if fully credible,
they could not really protect 
10-year bonds. When investors
realised the deficiencies in the res-
cue plan, spreads increased again
and on many days even rose above
the level reached before the agree-
ment of the EU countries. On
Friday, 7 May 2010, the average
interest spread over Germany’s for
the countries protected by EFSF
(all euro-area countries except
Greece, weighted by the GDP of
the respective country) amounted
to 1.08 percentage points. There-
after, the average spread declined
for several weeks, but as early 
as June it had increased again to
1.10 points. In September it aver-
aged 1.08 points, and in Novem-
ber 1.27 points. These spread lev-
els are way above those experi-
enced during the initial, stable
period of the euro. In this initial
phase, the average spread was only 0.4 percentage
points. Thus, relative to this early benchmark the new
spread levels were considered as an ominous crisis.
However, at no time were the spreads even close to
those of 1995, i.e. before the final negotiations on the
introduction of the euro. That year the spread over
Germany of the countries protected by EFSF had
averaged 2.60 percentage points. That was consider-
ably higher than the peak in 2010, and more than dou-
ble the average spread on 7 May (1.08 points), when
the rescue packages were quickly assembled on the
grounds that this was the only way to prevent a sys-
temic crisis. 
2.1.3 Who was hit and who has been rescued (so far)? 
The large and volatile interest spreads emerging in
2010 in the euro area were considered particularly
dangerous not only because they sharply raised bor-
rowing costs in many countries but also because a
substantial share of the troublesome debt was held by
commercial banks in core European countries, which
thus found themselves potentially exposed to large
losses. As shown in Figure 2.2, the potential magni-
tude of the write-off losses was quite large. On 7 May
2010 10-year Greek bonds, issued four years before
the crisis, were traded at a discount of more than
30 percent; longer-term Portuguese and Irish bonds
were traded at discounts of about 10 percent. A few
months later, the discounts on the Greek, Portuguese
and Irish bonds were substantially higher. By No-
vember 2010, the discounts on Irish bonds were
approaching 25 percent. 
The losses caused Ireland to be the first country to
apply for help from the EFSF in November 2010.
This was clearly a relief both for commercial banks
and for Ireland, as the country could then save on
interest payments on newly issued government debt
and keep its rescue promises. Against an ongoing
market rate of interest between 8.3 percent and
9.4 percent charged by private investors on Irish gov-
ernment bonds with a maturity of 5 to 10 years,
towards the end of November Ireland was given the
opportunity to borrow funds with a similar maturity
from the EFSF at the substantially lower rate of
5.8 percent. It is debatable whether Ireland really
was in a crisis that justified the help from the rescue
funds. After all, Ireland has very low labour taxes in
comparison to other EU countries that it could eas-
ily have increased to solve the country’s liquidity
problems without jeopardizing the country’s own
“business model” explicitly based on low corporate
(not low labour) taxes. 
The ownership of government bonds issued by the
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Codes and Sources: Greece: ISIN GR0124028623, Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Finance, www.minfin.gr. Portugal: ISIN
PTOTE6OE0006, Portuguese Treasury and Government Debt Agency, www.igcp.pt. Ireland: ISIN IE0034074488, National Treasury
Management Agency, www.ntma.ie. Spain: ISIN ES00000120J8, Tesoro Público, www.tesoro.es. Italy: ISIN IT0004019581, Dipartimento
del Tesoro, www.dt.tesoro.ti. Germany: ISIN DE0001135309, Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Finanzagentur GmbH, www.deutsche-
finanzagentur.de. France: ISIN FR0010288357, Agence France Trésor, www.aft.gouv.fr. Development at stock exchanges Frankfurt:
www.ariva.de. Calculations by the Ifo Institute.
Note: Monthly moving average of daily closing prices of selected government bonds with 10-year maturity and an annual coupon payment
from the emissions in 2006 (upper left diagram: daily closing prices without smoothing). Trading place: Frankfurt Stock Exchange. Some
datapoints for which no prices could be identified have benn interpolated.
a) for the French bond: emission rate on 7-2-2006=100.
b) 16-year term and issue 2004.
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Figure 2.2data by banks’ nationality. France is clearly leading
the league. The French banking system went scot-free
through the first wave of the financial crisis because it
had invested relatively little in structured US securi-
ties. Whereas German banks had lost almost one
quarter (23.9 percent) of their equity by 1 February
2010 due to write-downs on financial products, the
corresponding loss by French banks amounted to
only one tenth (10.5 percent).1 However, the French
banking system was much more exposed to the
European debt crisis. Before the rescue operations, the
stock of government bonds issued by GIPS countries
held by the French banking system was 55 percent
bigger than that of German banks when measured in
euros. In relation to GDP it was actually 95 percent
bigger. 
The key question is of course the extent to which the
banking systems of countries exposed to the
European debt crisis were actually put at risk by the
large write-off losses on government bonds. It turns
out that the answer to this question is far from obvi-
ous. The reason is that commercial banks in core
European countries typically hold a large amount of
bonds issued by their own governments, which, as an
effect of the crisis, generated huge capital gains.
During the financial turmoil, in fact, the flight to
quality not only raised the spread charged to crisis
countries; it also reduced the level of interest rates
that markets charged to virtuous countries. As shown
in Figure 2.2, capital gains on bonds issued by coun-
tries in good fiscal standing were on the order of
10 percent relative to the par values. Unfortunately,
detailed information on the banks’ holdings of gov-
ernment securities from virtuous
countries is not available. How-
ever, a back-of-the-envelope cal-
culation based on the informa-
tion in Figure 2.2 suggests that
aggregate capital gains on Ger-
man and French government
bonds were twice as large as the
aggregate capital losses on the
bonds issued by the GIPS coun-
tries – accounting for the fact that
the outstanding stock of debt
issued by Germany and France is
about three times as large.2
In addition, it may well be that
during the crisis aggressive in-
vestors laid the foundations for
considerable profits. Whoever purchased bonds of the
GIPS countries at very low prices at the peak of the
European debt crisis is bound to enjoy considerable
capital gains if rescue packages end up offering full
protection to their investments. On Greek bonds, for
instance, investors’profits could amount up to 50 per-
cent of their investment if the rescue packages of May
2010 are extended indefinitely and unlimited – bring-
ing the prices of these bonds back to the neighbour-
hood of par. 
2.2 Monetary unification, capital flows and housing 
bubbles: an interpretation of the events
To fully understand the nature of the crisis and the
implications of alternative rescue strategies, it is
important to have a clear picture of how the intro-
duction of the euro affected the economies of the
countries that adopted the new currency. With the cre-
ation of the euro, for the first time in history there was
a true European capital market, freed from the burden
of currency risks. By demolishing the barriers
between the capital markets, a common currency in a
single market allowed capital to flow almost friction-
lessly from rich to poor countries. This speeded up the
convergence process, boosting the growth of the
countries that had previously lagged behind. 
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Claims of foreign banks on the public sectors
of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (GIPS)
Source: Bank for International Settlements, BIS Quarterly Review, September 2010, p. 16.
End-Q1 2010, billion euros
Figure 2.3
1 Sinn (2010a), p. 177, Figure 8.6.
2 By the end of 2009 the outstanding stock of German government
bonds was 1.76 billion euros, that of France 1.49 billion euros, of
Spain 0.56 billion euros, of Greece 0.30 billion euros, of Ireland
0.10 billion euros and of Portugal 0.13 billion euros. If their respec-
tive appreciation and depreciation relative to their nominal values
was the same as those considered in Figure 2.2 for the end of
November 2010, the government bonds of Germany and France had
a value of 316.1 billion euros above and those of the GIPS countries
a value of 148.6 billion euros below their emissions volumes.EEAG Report 2011 75
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Figure 2.4 shows that from 1995 to 2009 Ireland grew
by 105 percent, Greece by 56 percent and Spain by
50 percent, while the euro area on average was grow-
ing by 30 percent. Portugal matched the average of
the euro area. Germany and Italy, on the other hand,
grew only by 16 percent and 11 percent, respectively.
The two countries were the laggards not only of the
euro area but of Europe as a whole, including all
countries up to the Russian border. 
The creation of the common capital market not only
led to the sharp interest rate convergence shown in
Figure 2.1, it also fostered the creation of new seg-
ments of the capital market that formerly did not
exist. By way of example, in
Spain before the euro it was
impossible to obtain fixed-rate
loans with 20-year maturity. Over
long maturities, interest rates
were variable and, most impor-
tantly, extremely high. With the
euro, rather abruptly, long-term
loans at fixed interest rates
became widely available, at rates
that were strikingly lower than
before, both in nominal and real
terms (see Chapter 4, Figure 4.4)
The opportunity to borrow for
long durations at low rates
fuelled the real estate market,
generating a housing boom
which in turn created new jobs
and raised incomes. Spain went
through a period often called the
“Golden Decade”. In Spain and
Ireland the boom was so large
that it triggered a wave of immi-
gration which in part relaxed the
supply constraint on construc-
tion services. At the same time,
rising house prices not only made
owners of real estate richer; it
also provided them with more
equity capital against which they
could borrow even more. Foreign
funds flowed abundantly into
these countries to finance new
enterprises, within and outside
the construction sector.
The sustained rise in house
prices, however, also fuelled
expectations of persistent appre-
ciation, way beyond what could
have been reasonably predicted based on fundamen-
tals. What could have evolved as a healthy conver-
gence process deteriorated into mispricing and turned
into a bubble that ultimately burst, leading to the cur-
rent debt crisis. The development of house prices in
selected countries is shown in Figure 2.5. House prices
typically grew much faster than GDP (see Chapter 4,
Figures 4.5 and 4.6). 
Households’ expenditure plans were driven by expec-
tations of sustained high real growth, and they kept
borrowing under the mistaken belief that their real
income would at least keep up with their rising inter-
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Maximum price decline after the peak
    Ireland                         -38%
    United Kingdom         -17%
    Spain                           -13%
    France                         -10%
Source: Land Registry, House Price Index; The Economic and Social Research Institute; Irish Economy, Permanent TSB/ESRI House
Price Index; European Central Bank, Statistical Data Warehouse - Residential property price indicator; Federal Statistical Office,
GENESIS database (Wiesbaden 2010); Banca d`Italia, Statistical Appendix - Economic Bulletin no. 53, July 2009; INSEE France,
loaded with EcoWin, 20 January 2011.
Figure 2.5dropped sharply in the GIPS countries, and became
even negative in Greece and Portugal, approaching
minus 12 percent and minus 8 percent respectively rel-
ative to GDP in 2009 (see Chapter 3, Figure 3.11). 
As high demand created persistent overheating in
these economies, rapidly rising wages and prices soon
undermined competitiveness, especially in those coun-
tries that had enjoyed the greatest benefits from the
interest rate convergence. Figure 2.6 shows the rate of
growth of the GDP deflator in selected euro-area
countries in the 14 years from 1995 to 2009. It is
apparent that Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal
increased their prices much faster than the average of
the euro-area countries. In trade-weighted terms the
real appreciation was 23 percent relative to their trad-
ing partners. From a foreign trade perspective, had
national currencies still been in
place, this would be equivalent to
a sizeable nominal currency ap-
preciation for unchanged prices.
Conversely, relative to its euro
trading partners, Germany
underwent an internal real depre-
ciation as large as 18 percent – its
domestic price development
being compounded by those
(with an opposite sign) in the
GIPS countries. Relative to the
GIPS countries only, indeed,
Germany’s prices depreciated by
28 percent. Diverging inflation
rates gradually improved the
competitiveness of the German
economy and undermined that of
the GIPS countries. Moreover,
the stagnation caused by the cap-
ital exports that were to a large
measure induced by the euro kept
imports down. This resulted in
growing current account imbal-
ances in the euro area, which,
comparing Germany with the
GIPS countries, eventually grew
to the order of 200 billion euros a
year, as shown in Figure 2.7.
French finance minister Christine
Lagarde and others argued in this
context that Germany was taking
advantage of the currency union,
bearing a substantial responsibility for this develop-
ment. “It takes two to tango”, she said. 
While the tango analogy is certainly a correct descrip-
tion of what happened, its moral connotation is mis-
leading as it overlooks the mechanisms that brought
the divergences about. Namely, it overlooks the fact
that Germany’s depreciation was the result of a slump
of its economy, making Germany the laggard of
Europe, creating mass unemployment and raising the
need for far-reaching reforms of the social system.3
These reforms were aimed at taking away rights of the
unemployed, which at that time were perceived as per-
manent entitlements. They were painful enough to
terminate a government and ignite an arduous politi-
cal discourse, which placed great strains on society.
These recent economic and political developments in







































Source: Eurostat, Database, Economy and Finance, National accounts,GDP and main components - Price indices, 30 
November 2010; Ifo Institute calculations.
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Germany hardly square with the notion of a country
that had benefited from the euro more than others.
Germany recorded the second-lowest growth rates in
Europe and experienced a deflation of the real estate
market. A country drawing particular profits from the
euro can hardly be expected to fall from the third to
the tenth rank in GDP per capita terms, as Germany
did in the period from 1995 to 2009. 
The tango analogy also overlooks the fact that the
current account balance is the mirror of the capital
balance. By definition, a current account surplus is a
net capital export and a deficit is a net capital import,
as capital and goods flows balance out. Both the cur-
rent account and the capital balance are determined
simultaneously in the economy. Sometimes the goods-
flows take the lead and determine the capital flows as
residuals, as is described in conventional models of
the business cycle. Sometimes, however, the capital
flows determine the goods flows via supply-side
effects. Due to the perceived reduction of uncertainty
surrounding the introduction of the euro and the
interest convergence this brought about, the capital
flows dominated the goods flows in the first few years
in the life of the new currency. The interest conver-
gence implied a huge capital export from the German
economy into the economies of the GIPS, which over-
heated the latter and cooled down the former. The
overheating reduced the competitiveness of the GIPS
countries via a real appreciation, while imports surged
in line with real incomes. In Germany, by contrast, the
cooling of the economy improved the competitiveness
via depreciation, while low growth rates slowed down
imports. 
While the interest convergence resulting from the
introduction of the euro quickly triggered an invest-
ment boom in the GIPS countries, it took, as always,
a few years until the current accounts reacted suffi-
ciently to actually result in net capital inflows (J-curve
effect). Before imports could rise, the interest-driven
expansion of real and nominal incomes had to take
place. And export quantities could only react after the
rise in export prices, which itself resulted from the
wage increases that the economic boom brought
about (with ambiguous implications for export val-
ues). Nevertheless, the pressure of the desired capital
flows eventually opened the current account deficits
in a measure necessary to actually allow for net capi-
tal inflows. In the years preceding the crisis, all GIPS
countries developed sizeable net capital imports. In
the years from 2005 to 2008, Greece had a current
account deficit of about 12 percent of GDP, Portugal
11 percent, Spain 9 percent and Ireland about 4.5 per-
cent. Only Ireland and Spain have now managed to
reduce this deficit significantly.4
In line with this interpretation, Figure 2.8 provides an
updated picture of capital flows in and out of the
euro-area countries along with long-term net invest-
ment rates, totalling up both private and public invest-
ment. The figure shows that investment is bigger in
capital importing countries: obviously these countries
had abundant and cheap funds to nourish high invest-
ment rates. By contrast, Germany had the lowest rate
of all European countries. In fact, in the period from
1995 to 2008 Germany had the lowest net investment
share of all OECD countries, while being the world’s
second largest capital exporter after China. German
banks collected domestic savings and invested them
elsewhere in the world, including the GIPS countries,
the United Kingdom and of course the United States.
From 2002 to 2009, Germany had aggregate savings
(net savings by households, firms and government) of
1,621 billion euros. While this was the amount of
money available for net investment in equipment,
buildings, homes, roads and other public infrastruc-
ture, in fact only one third – 562 billion euros – was
invested at home. Two thirds – 1,058 billion euros –
was exported to other countries. Four fifths of this
capital export was financial investment and one fifth
was direct investment. 
While these patterns in principle also characterize a
fundamentally stable convergence process,5 our analy-
sis above suggests reasons to believe that the observed
imbalances were ultimately excessive and led to a vast
misallocation of resources. Abundance of cheap
funds brought a period of “soft budget constraints”
to capital-importing countries, to cite a concept that
Janós Kornai once used to predict the fall of
Communism.6 The soft budget constraints meant that
a credit-fuelled internal boom was spreading from the
construction industry to the entire economy, pushing
wages, prices and incomes from the provision of non-
traded goods above the level sustainable in the long-
run, creating the bubble that ultimately resulted in the
4 While in the case of Greece, Portugal and Spain, the current
account deficit went along with substantial trade deficits, Ireland is
an exception inasmuch as it always maintained a trade surplus.
However, as Ireland had already imported very much capital in ear-
lier years, it had to pay substantial interest and profit income to for-
eigners, which also needed to be financed with capital imports, pri-
marily with directly “imported” capital in the form of profit reten-
tions of existing foreign firms operating in Ireland.
5 For a formal analysis and prediction of these developments in the
sense of a beneficial convergence process, see Sinn and Koll (2001).
A less optimistic analysis of the same theme 10 years later can be
found in: Sinn (2010b).
6 Kornai (1980).European debt crisis. By the same token, Germany
suffered from overly tight budget constraints as
resources were withdrawn, entering a period of low
growth rates and near stagnation under the euro,
which ended abruptly when the debt crisis suddenly
changed risk perceptions.7
The imbalances in the capital-importing countries do
not necessarily take the form of outstanding current
account deficits. Even if Ireland had not had a size-
able current account deficit, mispricing and misallo-
cation might have been dangerous for economic sta-
bility, if they led to unchecked risk-taking by financial
intermediaries. If the government does not supervise
and appropriately regulate financial intermediaries ex
ante but lets them operate with
the expectations of public sector
guarantees on their balance
sheets, the resulting imbalance
may also take the form of exces-
sive risk-taking, which systemati-
cally endangers both public and
external solvency ex post, when
uncertainty about returns is
realised. This was indeed the
main lesson from the crisis in the
East Asian countries in 1997–98.
Economies that were apparently
sound in regard to their public
and external outlook before the
crisis, succumbed to large specu-
lative flows against their assets
and currencies, driven by the in-
vestors’ realisation of the large
implicit commitment by the pub-
lic sector. 
The Irish case is, however, a re-
minder of the strict interconnec-
tion between external, fiscal and
financial imbalances. Each crisis
country has its own mix of imbal-
ances in these three dimensions,
depending on specific circum-
stances. For the euro area as a whole, however, the ques-
tion is to make sure that its institutional system can
address potential sources of instability in all of them.
2.3 Excessive public debt despite the Stability and 
Growth Pact
In countries that benefited from the capital inflows,
private budget constraints were soft and financial
intermediaries took on too much risk, arguably cre-
ating hidden public liabilities. But even independent-
ly of hidden liabilities, governments also showed lit-
tle fiscal discipline under the euro, in spite of the




































































Source: Eurostat, Database, Economy and Finance, National Accounts; OECD, Database National Accounts; Österreichische 
Nationalbank, Statistik und Melderservice, Leistungsbilanz im Detail, 30 September 2010.
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Source: European Commission, Economic Forecast Autumn 2010.
Debt-to-GDP ratios (left) and surplus-to-GDP ratios (right)
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7 Of course these imbalances are not spe-
cific to the euro area – large mispricing in
the real estate market at the root of the cri-
sis was also experienced in Anglo-Saxon
countries, for instance. See Sinn (2010a)
and Sinn, Buchen and Wollmershäuser
(2010) for a related interpretation. Yet the
introduction of the euro in the single mar-
ket undoubtedly played a key role in deter-
mining the magnitude of the imbalances.
Moreover, consistent with the constitution-
al foundations of the euro, as discussed
below, one would expect euro-area coun-
tries to have used appropriate policies to
avoid the imbalances in the first place.EEAG Report 2011 79
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Stability and Growth Pact agreed upon in 1996,
which (following the Maastricht Treaty) imposed a
60 percent threshold for the debt-to-GDP ratio and a
3 percent threshold for the deficit-to-GDP ratio. 
As Figure 2.9 shows, in nearly all euro-area countries
the debt-to-GDP ratio has increased considerably
since 1995, and many countries that were below the
60 percent threshold are now above it. Between 1995
and 2010, only 8 out of 27 countries (Sweden,
Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Finland, Hungary,
Italy and Estonia) managed to reduce their debt-to-
GDP levels. All other countries, even those that
underwent a rapid growth process, have now more
debt relative to GDP than when the euro was
announced. In 2010, 14 countries had a debt-to-GDP
ratio above 60 percent, with the average ratio for all
EU countries reaching 79 percent. In the euro area,
this average stood at 84 percent. 
Despite the signs of recovery in 2010, the fiscal out-
look is disturbingly far off the boundaries of the Pact:
in 24 of 27 cases, the deficit-to-GDP ratios exceed the
3 percent mark. The Stability and Growth Pact obvi-
ously has not been respected. 
In fact, the Pact has never been taken seriously. Until
2010, the records for the European Union show
97 (country and year) cases of deficits above 3 per-
cent. Less than one third of these cases (29) coincided
with a significantly large domestic recession, hence in
principle could even be justified on the basis of the
original definition of the Pact.8 Still, there was no
ground for justification in the
remaining 68 cases. Member
states were ready to “reinterpret
and redefine”, again and again,
to make the conditions softer as
to match ex post the fiscal devel-
opment in some countries with
strong bargaining power. 
Whatever remains of the Pact, it
is generally considered to be
toothless.9 The Pact foresaw severe sanctions for vio-
lation of the deficit criterion, involving the breaching
contry having to put down a non-interest bearing
deposit equal to 0.2 percent of GDP, convertible into
a fee if the excess deficit persisted for more than two
years.10 Moreover, it was to pay a variable fee equal to
one tenth of the excess deficit-to-GDP ratio, con-
strained to a maximum of 0.5 percent of GDP.11 Up
to this day no sanction has ever been imposed on any
of the EU countries. 
With the widespread failure of surveillance exposed
by the Greek crisis, it became clear that the Pact had
been ignored in virtually all its dimensions. 
2.4 The role of the Basel system
It would be too simplistic to only blame the crisis on
the lack of “debt constraints”in the capital-importing
countries. After all, similar problems emerged in other
areas of the world. Arguably, one of the main drivers
of the European sovereign debt crisis was the ineffi-
cient and insufficient banking regulation provided by
the Basel system, whose rules were actually responsi-
ble for many types of distortions, but in particular
created strong incentives for banks to lend to the gov-
ernment sector. 
In the Basel system, banks must meet minimum equi-
ty requirements, above all the so-called Tier 1 ratio,
which is defined relative to the sum of risk-weighted
assets in the banks’balance sheets. The risk weights in
Member states with excessive deficits
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8 Resolution of the European Council on
the Stability and Growth Pact (1997), pp.
1–2. Only during a severe recession or if
the deficit is caused by unusual events out-
side its own control is a country allowed to
increase its debt by more than 3 percent
of GDP (Council Regulation (EC)
No. 1467/97 of 7 July 1997, Article 2).
9 Council Regulation (EC) No 1056/2005
of 27 June 2005, Article 1. 
10 Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of
7 July 1997, Article 13.
11 Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of
7 July 1997, Article 12.this system are, for example, 0.5 for loans to normal
firms of the real economy and 0.2 for interbank loans,
thus forcing the banks to hold corresponding
amounts of equity capital. For government bonds, on
the other hand, the risk weights were zero, which
meant that there was no constraint at all on the banks’
lending operations. Theoretically, banks were allowed
to leverage the loans given to the government sector
infinitely. There were some exceptions for countries
with extremely bad ratings, but these did not apply in
Europe. Even for loans to Greece, which had never
enjoyed an AAA rating from rating agencies, banks
had not been required to hold equity capital before
the outbreak of the crisis. 
The missing debt constraints were particularly prob-
lematic insofar as there were reasons enough for
banks to leverage their operations excessively. These
reasons range from tax advantages of debt over equi-
ty finance to explanations of why holders of bank
deposits and bank securities did not punish high
leverage by demanding higher interest rates. The latter
include the opaqueness of banking operations and the
implicit bailout guarantees of governments. Chapter 5
discusses such reasons in more detail. 
Small wonder that under these conditions the credit
flow from Europe’s savers into countries that lacked
internal debt constraints expanded rapidly in recent
years and that European banks had such an enor-
mous exposure to the sovereign debt of the GIPS
countries, which made the rescue measures of May
seem inevitable to politicians (recall Figure 2.3).
2.5 A new economic governance system for the euro area
As explained above, the trade and financial imbal-
ances of the euro-area countries followed from exces-
sive capital flows which themselves were the result of
soft budget constraints. Arguably, without the euro
the extent of misallocation from excessive capital
flows would have been more contained. Persistent
interest differentials, dictated by the risk of deprecia-
tion and default, would have deterred capital flows
within the area. 
Under the euro the natural constraints of currency
premia on excessive capital flows no longer exist. A
country cannot inflate its debt away because its bonds
are denominated in a common currency whose value
cannot be manipulated by national policymakers.
Initially, the apparent immunity to a devaluation risk
led market investors to virtually eliminate interest
spreads, leading to excessive capital flows and trade
imbalances, as described above. After the financial
crisis that swept from the United States to Europe, it
became clear, however, that risk within the euro area
was not as small as investors believed, as a rising risk
of default was taking the place of depreciation risk. 
To be clear, some widening of interest rate spreads rel-
ative to the excessively low levels before the crisis is to
be welcomed and, as argued below, should be an
objective of European economic policy. In a well-
functioning capital market, interest spreads are the
price of country-specific differences in creditworthi-
ness. When spreads are not adequate, despite different
repayment probabilities, mispricing causes countries
with lower repayment probabilities to import too
much capital (as explained above). 
The problem is that in crisis periods the self-correc-
tion mechanism through which spreads balance out
excessive borrowing and lending may typically come
into effect not only too late but also too sharply, with
spreads swinging from too low to prohibitively high
levels in a matter of weeks – as often described by the
literature that stresses the danger of “sudden stops”in
international capital flows. Brakes that block the
wheels of a car may actually cause accidents instead
of preventing them. What Europe needs is an anti-
lock braking system for capital flows. This is the goal
of a much-needed new economic governance system
for the euro area as a whole. 
The new economic governance system needs to
address the deficiency of the current institutional
arrangements. As discussed above, misallocation and
mispricing create imbalances in three interconnected
dimensions: fiscal, financial and external. The new
economic governance needs to address the roots of
misallocation and mispricing in all these dimensions. 
What is the main deficiency of Europe’s current eco-
nomic constitution? To put it simply, markets found
ample reasons to disregard government defaults as a
real possibility. Investors knew that, at the end of the
day, the euro-area countries would go out of their way
to come up with resources to keep a troubled govern-
ment afloat, disregarding the no-bailout clause of the
Maastricht Treaty.
The lack of credibility of the no-bailout principle can
be attributed to different factors. Commentaries on
the Greek crisis, for instance, often stressed that cred-
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itor countries would intervene with rescue packages
mainly to guarantee their own banking systems,
which were likely to lose money in a debt-restructur-
ing episode.12 There is also a more general formula-
tion of the same issue.
As already examined in detail in early analyses of the
Maastricht Treaty, a key factor systematically under-
mining the credibility of the no-bailout principle is
the fear of contagion and systemic consequences from
default.13 Greece was not abandoned in 2010 because,
in the perception of policymakers, Europe (and as a
matter of fact, the whole world) could not run the risk
of “another Lehman”. 
Whether an early Greek restructuring would have cre-
ated another wave of panic at a global level is debat-
able. Probably the fears were vastly overstated given
that bank rescue programmes worth 4,900 billion
euros that had been created in the autumn of 2008
after Lehman Brothers to unfreeze the interbank mar-
ket were still in place. Because of Lehman, a second
Lehman was unlikely to happen. Europe’s stable
countries all had enough reserves to help their banks
directly rather than indirectly via a bailout of the
unstable ones. Nevertheless, the risk of another break-
down of the interbank market was enough of a polit-
ical argument to keep default always last in the list of
the policy options under consideration.
This is how unchecked fears of contagion can create a
deadly chain of events within the euro area. Fears of
contagion underlie the too-big-to-fail doctrine: banks
and countries are saved because their default may
result in a liquidity and credit crisis that could stran-
gle the real economy at a national and international
level. Protected by the implicit insurance, then, finan-
cial intermediaries take on too much risk, govern-
ments issue too much explicit and implicit debt, with
the result of raising the likelihood of a crisis and
therefore of generalised bailouts.
With fears of contagion, governments feel compelled
to insure the liabilities of their banks. Here the issue is
complicated by the fact that, at the wholesale level,
large financial intermediaries operate cross-border.
Before the crisis, the issue of which government would
pick up the bill was often discussed. In light of the cri-
sis, we know that, no matter how international the
financial intermediaries are, without a proper institu-
tional setting some government will eventually save
them. In Europe, international banks were broken up
in different institutions along national boundaries,
each institution saved by one government. In other
cases, some form of war of attrition – with each gov-
ernment waiting for the other to take the lead in bail-
ing out the bank – may have actually exacerbated the
crisis, raising the bill to be footed with taxpayers’
money.
It is thus the fear of contagion that leads euro-area
countries to bail out member states in crisis. A fiscal
crisis in one country potentially affects the whole area
through different channels. A fundamental channel
operates via the exposure of international investors to
default risk depending on their portfolio of govern-
ment bonds and private assets issued by firms and res-
idents in the defaulting country. As is well under-
stood, in case of sovereign default, there are strong
spill-over effects from the government to the private
sector, apparent in the correlation of risk premia
charged by markets to both. Threat of government
default in fact raises the riskiness of private firms
operating in the jurisdiction, as these may be taxed,
and in any case face a disrupted domestic market for
goods and credit. The empirical evidence however
suggests that the strength of these spill-over effects
varies, depending on features of the firm: all else
being equal, firms with large export markets appear to
be less affected than firms relying heavily on the
domestic market. On the other hand, in a panic fun-
damental risk assessment may be swamped by other,
liquidity-related considerations.
Unfortunately, however, with governments interven-
ing to prevent a contagion via the banking system, the
bailout itself becomes a channel of contagion. The
Irish case demonstrates this clearly. The Irish govern-
ment, with a stellar fiscal record in previous years, ran
into trouble in autumn 2010 and was forced to seek
help from the European rescue fund because it had
promised to bail out its banking system with guaran-
tees two-and-a-half times the Irish GDP. Because
Ireland gave a practically unlimited bailout promise
rather than erecting a firewall around its banks, the
Irish banking crisis became a crisis of the Irish state.
In a similar way, the bailout of endangered European
countries may in future spread the risk of insolvency
to governments that otherwise would be sound.
Intergovernmental bailout systems in Europe risk
opening up additional contagion channels through
which the crisis of a single country could in the end
endanger the euro system as such.
12 One can also imagine financial help that is linked to political
alliances and converging voting strategies on other issues.
13 Buiter et al. (1993).This problem is exacerbated insofar as bailouts create
the moral hazard effects explained above. The govern-
ments of over-indebted countries continue borrowing
and creditors continue providing cheap loans reck-
lessly. The interest spreads that would normally limit
the incentive to borrow if investors feared a default
risk are artificially reduced and hence there are exces-
sive international capital flows, perpetuating the trade
imbalances that led to the current crisis. 
For Europe, there is no alternative but to create rules
and institutions that induce market discipline.
Credibility of the no-bailout clause is the essential
prerequisite. As we emphasised in our analysis above,
Europe cannot afford to abandon market discipline
vis-à-vis debtors; this is the cornerstone of its com-
mon currency and common market. But this requires
setting up rules and institutions that address the fun-
damental issue of containing the fears and thus the
risk of contagion via the banking system.
A plausible system could stand on two pillars. One is
an EU-controlled public surveillance and supervision
process for public debt and the banking system. The
other is a credible crisis mechanism that strengthens
market discipline by reducing the implicit bailout
guarantee that characterised the previous situation
under the euro while protecting the markets against
speculative attacks and panic. 
To address the danger of excessive capital flows
analysed in the first part of this chapter, some politi-
cal voices in Europe have advocated a strategy of
direct controls on trade flows, with sanctions if these
flows deviate from politically determined target levels.
The idea is that these controls would automatically
force countries to adjust their wages (to enhance or
reduce competitiveness) and use Keynesian policy
measures to boost or dampen aggregate demand,
when this is too low or too high. We find such pro-
posals naive and dangerous, because, by attempting to
mimic through controls the outcome of market disci-
pline, they are bound to confuse symptoms with caus-
es and direct the attention to policy tools that are
entirely inappropriate as remedies against long-term
structural deficiencies of market economies. An
important lesson from the ongoing crisis is that trade
flows resulted from capital flows and there is simply
no way to agree on what excessive trade and capital
flows actually are. 
Other voices advocate eurobonds, i.e. a procedure for
jointly borrowing for normal purposes in the capital
market by pooling the creditworthiness of the euro-
area countries. We can only warn that taking the
direction of issuing common eurobonds will exacer-
bate the problems we see as being at the root of the
crisis. Eurobonds could do nothing but strengthen
incentives for opportunistic behaviour on the part of
debtors and creditors, given that they prevent the
emergence of fundamental risk premia, by acting as
full-coverage insurance against insolvency. Euro-
bonds entail an across-the-board equalisation of
interest rates regardless of the creditworthiness of
each debtor country and, for that reason, would be
tantamount to a subsidy to capital flows to those
countries. Even if issued in small quantities,
Eurobonds would give new debt excesses carte
blanche, de facto reproducing the problem at the root
of the current crisis. The euro area would then surely
collapse in a system of soft budget constraints and
face a similar destiny as the regimes for which Kornai
once made his predictions. 
2.5.1 Political debt constraints 
The Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth
Pact centred around the idea that there would be no
bailout and that surveillance and numerical rules
could be enforced with pecuniary sanctions to prevent
fiscal crises altogether. This approach failed entirely.
There was a bailout, and despite 68 violations, sanc-
tions were never imposed. 
Despite or because of this frustrating outcome, the
euro area has to try again, and now harder than before
to overcome the deficiencies. A new Stability and
Growth Pact should provide tougher and more rigor-
ous government debt constraints, and in our judgement
the proposals of the Van Rompuy Commission are
worth pursuing. Some of the measures advocated by
the Van Rompuy Commission had indeed already been
proposed by the EEAG in an earlier report.14 Our sug-
gestions for a revised Pact still hold. 
• The deficit limit should be modified in accordance
with each country’s debt-to-GDP ratio, in order to
demand more debt discipline early enough from
the highly indebted countries. As an example, the
limit could be tightened by one percentage point
for every ten percentage points that the debt-to-
GDP ratio exceeds the 60 percent limit. A country
with an 80 percent debt-to-GDP ratio, for instance,
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would be allowed a maximum deficit of 1 percent
of GDP, while a country with a 110 percent debt-
to-GDP ratio would be required to have a budget
surplus of at least 2 percent.
• Sanctions for exceeding the debt limits must apply
automatically, without any further political deci-
sions, once Eurostat has formally ascertained the
deficits. The sanctions can be of a pecuniary nature
and take the form of covered bonds collateralised
with privatisable state assets, and they can also
contain non-pecuniary elements such as the with-
drawal of voting rights.
• In order to ascertain deficit and debt-to-GDP
ratios, Eurostat must be given the right to directly
request information from every level of the nation-
al statistics offices and to conduct independent
controls on site of the data gathering procedures.
They should also be held responsible for failure to
control.
• In case all the above assistance and control systems
fail and insolvency looms, the country in question
may be asked to leave the euro area by a majority
of the euro-area members.
• A voluntary exit from the euro area must be possi-
ble at any time.
2.5.2 A credible crisis mechanism
While we endorse the attempt to rewrite the Stability
and Growth Pact, we are much more confident about
the discipline that markets would impose on debtor
countries. It is true that markets overreacted in this
crisis. But unlike the political debt constraints, the
market constraints were eventually put in place in
the end, limiting abruptly a non-sustainable develop-
ment course. No political mechanism would have
been able to force Greece, for example, to carry out
the present austerity measures in a way similar to
what has now been enforced by market reactions,
even though these reactions were mitigated by polit-
ical influence. 
The challenge to the euro area consists of defining a
crisis mechanism in which a credible rescue strategy
stringently binds private investors (they need to have
to bear some responsibility in case of losses) while at
the same time preventing a panic-like aggravation of
market turbulences. In addition, this mechanism
should contribute to the stabilisation of the banking
system in order to avoid a spiral of actual or alleged
emergencies, raising the need, or the temptation, for
further rescue actions.
In view of the decisions at the EU summit of
16–17 December 2010, we propose a three-stage pro-
cedure that distinguishes between different degrees of
a crisis: illiquidity, pending insolvency and actual
insolvency. 
Step 1: A procedure to provide Community loans to a
country that faces a temporary liquidity crisis because
of dysfunctional markets, assuming this country will
soon be able to help itself. 
Step 2: A procedure serving the function of a breakwa-
ter structure for a country that is threatened by insol-
vency, though not yet insolvent, giving grounds to hope
that it will eventually recover and become solvent again.
Step 3: An insolvency procedure in the full sense of
the word. 
We place particular emphasis on the breakwater proce-
dure, which we design in a way that comes close to a liq-
uidity help and makes a piecemeal approach to a coun-
try’s problems possible without it defaulting on its entire
outstanding government debt. Given this breakwater
procedure, liquidity help according to Step 1 can be pro-
vided under very strict limitations, excluding countries
that are merely threatened by insolvency.
2.5.2.1 The EU decisions
On 16–17 December 2010 the European Union decid-
ed to extend the life of the Luxembourg rescue fund
EFSF (European Financial Stability Facility) from
the previously foreseen three years to an indefinite
length of time and to give this fund a the new name:
ESM (European Stability Mechanism).15 The EFSM
(European Financial Stability Mechanism) that
allowed the European Union to borrow up to 60 bil-
lion euros (see Table 2.1) to fight what was perceived
as a systemic crisis of the euro area in May 2010 will
no longer be used. 
Like its predecessor, the ESM is supposed to borrow
internationally at favourable rates, given that it is
jointly guaranteed by all countries of the euro area.
However, to satisfy the requirements of the German
Constitutional Court, which is expected to declare the
decisions of May 2010 unconstitutional, a change in
the Union treaty is necessary before Germany can
actually provide the expected guarantees. The heads
15 European Council (2010).of state agreed on the following amendment of
Article 136 of the Union Treaty:16
“The Member States whose currency is the euro may
establish a stability mechanism to be activated if
indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro
area as a whole. The granting of any required finan-
cial assistance under the mechanism will be made sub-
ject to strict conditionality”
An important change relative to the EFSF is that “in
order to protect taxpayers’ money”, the Community
loans provided will be senior to any privately held
country debt, though junior to IMF claims.17
Moreover, unlike the EFSF, a “case-by-case participa-
tion of private sector creditors”in line with IMF rules
is foreseen, without any more detailed specification
being given.
From 2013 onwards all euro-area countries must
endow their government bonds with Collective Action
Clauses (CACs) that make majority decisions between
an insolvent country and its creditors possible, which
then become binding for all other creditors. 
A country that appears to be insolvent must negotiate
a comprehensive restructuring plan with its creditors.
The ESM may provide liquidity help during this peri-
od if debt sustainability can be reached through these
measures. 
Decisions about help coming from the ESM must be
unanimous, as was the case with EFSF decisions. Given
that the use of the EFSM (the 60 billion euros in
Table 2.1) which would have been possible after a quali-
fied majority decision has been ruled out by the Council
(it probably is illegal), the unanimity rule for the ESM
means that in future all help will have to be unanimous-
ly decided. A systematic redistribution of funds from
minorities to majorities is therefore ruled out. 
Assistance will, moreover, only be provided to a trou-
bled member state if the IMF, the European Union
and the ECB have come to the conclusion that the
state will be solvent again after a stringent internal
restructuring programme. 
In the following we both interpret as well as modify
the EU decision so as to generate a workable eco-
nomic governance system for the euro area. 
2.5.2.2 Basic requirements for the crisis mechanism
To comply with the above-mentioned goals, a credible
crisis mechanism must meet a number of prerequi-
sites: 
• It should not mutate into a transfer mechanism.
• It should foster efficient risk pricing by markets,
ensuring that adequate interest spreads prevent
further distortions in international capital flows.
• It should enable a country in need of help to con-
tinue fulfilling its governmental responsibilities
and to initiate a reform programme that will return
it onto an economically sustainable path. 
• It should predetermine and limit investors’ maxi-
mum losses. 
Concretely, we propose the following modifications to
and specifications of the Council decisions:18
I) Liquidity help
Along the lines of the current operations of the EFSF
the new ESM should be able to provide short-term
loans to a country that faces a mere liquidity crisis
without creditors participating at this stage. As liq-
uidity and impending insolvency cannot easily be dis-
tinguished, we propose a strict and short time-limita-
tion for this type of help. By its very definition, a liq-
uidity crisis cannot last forever.
As foreseen in the decision of 17 December 2010, the
loans provided by the ESM should be senior to any
private claims. In addition the loans could be collater-
alized with marketable state property. This is a safe-
guard against the liquidity help turning into a
resource transfer. It also makes sure that private cred-
itors continue to bear the default risk so as to show
prudence and charge an interest mark-up to cover the
risk. 
There is no point in having huge or even unlimited
credit lines for liquidity funds as is sometimes pro-
posed. What is required are facilities large enough to
cover the debt that needs to be replaced in the period
under consideration plus possibly an allowance for a
limited budget deficit, not more. The funds needed for
that purpose are contained. Larger funds would only
be necessary if the task of the fund was to support the
market value of outstanding government bonds. That,
EEAG Report 2011 84
Chapter 2
16 European Council (2010), Annex I, Article 1. 
17 For this and the following see European Council (2010), Annex II.
18 In doing this we make use of a proposal by Sinn and Carstensen
(2010), extended in Sinn, Buchen and Wollmershäuser (2010). EEAG Report 2011 85
Chapter 2
however, cannot be the function of the ESM because
it would be effectively equivalent to bailouts. 
II) Replacement bonds
The crisis mechanism should help a country that is
acutely threatened by insolvency by guarantees of the
ESM to continue refinancing itself on the financial
markets, albeit at higher rates of interest properly
reflecting the country’s default risk. Toward this end
the concerned country can offer its creditors, after a
limited haircut, newly created replacement bonds, to
be partially guaranteed by the ESM, in exchange for
maturing bonds. The term “haircut”refers to the low-
ering of the value of a bond and a corresponding
relinquishing of claims on the part of the creditor.
Limiting the haircut and partially guaranteeing the
replacement bonds will prevent a panic on financial
markets without allowing the protection by the ESM to
become a full-coverage insurance against insolvency. 
III) Modified collective action clauses (CAC) for all 
government bonds
The guarantees preceding the haircut are not to per-
tain to the government securities currently in circula-
tion (for which the haircut would be tantamount to a
breach of contract), but to all newly issued govern-
ment securities, including the replacement bonds. All
new public debt contracts will include a CAC for this
purpose. The receipts from the sale of new securities
with CACs is to serve the orderly servicing of the old
credits, which may also include loans by the ESM
granted under the current or new rescue programmes
(EFSF and ESM). 
As foreseen by the Council decision of 17 December
2010, the CAC permits a majority agreement of the
creditors that will then become generally binding. The
creditors will already agree at the time of purchasing
their debt claims to subject themselves to a majority
rule (e.g. a 75-percent majority) with respect to all
securities maturing at the same time. 
However, in addition, the new clauses should make it
possible for a country to find an agreement with only
those creditors whose debt matures at a particular
point in time without the owners of debt instruments
with other maturities being able to call in their claims
prematurely. Correspondingly, the majority rule is to
apply only to those creditors whose debt is maturing
simultaneously, and of course the decision is only
binding for them. Creditors with later maturities will
have to cross the bridge when they come to it. 
Waiving the right to call in the claims prematurely is
indispensable for the crisis mechanism, because it per-
mits solving the payment problems step by step as
they emerge. It prevents a temporary payment crisis
from becoming a sovereign bankruptcy. A crisis
mechanism that defines a procedure that applies only
to either a liquidity crisis where no haircut is imposed
or a full insolvency where the full outstanding debt is
at risk is not credible and therefore as useless as the
no-bailout clause of the Maastricht Treaty. Before it
applies there will always be new bailout activities to
prevent the insolvency from occurring. Creditors will
anticipate that and will thus return to the careless
lending behaviour that triggered the current crisis.
The interest spreads will disappear under such a
regime, and the excessive capital flows and trade
imbalances that caused this crisis will continue. 
We warn the heads of European states not to repeat
the fundamental mistake they made when designing
the Maastricht Treaty. 
Some may fear that these proposals will increase the
credit costs of all countries, including those that are
relatively creditworthy. But this fear is unfounded. As
empirical studies have shown, the introduction of
such clauses has only moderate effects on the returns
demanded from the financial markets. Interest rates
may actually decline for debtors with good credit
standing (as they did at the peak of the current crisis).
Only debtors with poor credit standing will have to
pay higher interest rates, on average; as explained
above, this is indispensable for a functioning capital
market.19
Because of the great importance of CACs for a mean-
ingful design of an effective crisis mechanism, what-
ever this will eventually look like in detail, the heads
of states are advised to agree that new government
bonds issued from now on are to be endowed with the
new provisions, rather than only from 2013 as is cur-
rently planned. Bonds with CACs should actually be
issued even ahead of the end of the negotiations on
the crisis mechanism. Postponing the issue of CAC
bonds to 2013 would be a mistake in view of the fact
that these bonds would greatly facilitate the resolution
19 See Eichengreen et al. (2003). of any looming fiscal difficulty and that it will take
years before they have penetrated the market. 
The European countries should take action to enlarge
the degree of market penetration for such bonds as
quickly as possible. For that purpose they should at
least agree that until 2013 only very short-term bonds
can be issued. 
It is moreover important that not only the euro-area
countries but all EU countries immediately switch to
the new type of bonds, because all of them have the
right to join the euro and all but two are even obliged
to do so, the exceptions being Denmark and the
United Kingdom. 
IV) Help only in a true liquidity or insolvency crisis
A crisis mechanism is meant to strengthen responsi-
bilities and thus reduce the probability of a crisis.
Thus, financial help does not have the function of
avoiding crises but only serves to solve a crisis when
it occurs. It is a separate issue whether new cohesion
and stabilisation systems should be implemented that
strengthen the performance of weaker economies in
general and would thereby make a crisis less proba-
ble. Should an expansion be considered, this can be
done with the use of EU funds outside the crisis
mechanism. 
By the same token, financial resources may be essen-
tial in stemming financial panics driven by self-fulfill-
ing expectations and illiquidity. However, liquidity
assistance during turmoil should be carefully designed
so as not to degenerate into a hidden bailout or inter-
est subsidy. This point is important insofar as there is
the political risk that by bending the terms under
which liquidity help is provided, the crisis mechanism
may degenerate into eurobonds, which we have dis-
missed above because of the disastrous consequences
they are likely to have for Europe.
It is debatable, as mentioned above, whether Ireland
was really in a liquidity crisis that justified providing
funds from the EFSF. The country was neither credit
constrained nor did it lack the power to increase its
taxes on immobile factors of production to solve its
problems on its own. Possibly the country took
advantage of the rescuing measures simply because it
wanted to borrow at lower interest rates. Such reasons
should be rigorously blocked by the rules to be speci-
fied.
V) Haircuts ahead of guarantees to ensure a correct 
pricing of risk (appropriate interest spreads)
The ESM guarantees the replacement bonds to be
issued only after the private creditors have waived a
substantial part of their claims. After all, one of the
main purposes of providing support from the com-
munity of states is to reduce the stock of outstanding
public liabilities. 
In addition, however, the participation of creditors is
absolutely necessary to ensure that they use caution in
engaging in risky credit transactions and apply appro-
priate interest mark-ups ahead of time. The interest
mark-ups in turn ought to restrain debtors from
engaging in excessive borrowing, so as to prevent a
new wave of inefficient capital movements and cur-
rent account imbalances within the euro area.
We stress that in the case of impending insolvency
under no circumstance should the countries in the euro
area agree to a crisis mechanism that grants aid first
and only afterward, when the aid is ineffective or turns
out to be insufficient, require private creditors to share
losses. For the participation of private creditors to be
credible, it must complement official help in a legally
binding form. And only if it is credible will the interest
mark-up have the desired disciplining effect.
As explained above, this principle should not be violat-
ed by a misinterpretation of the Council decision of
17 December 2010. Liquidity help as described in Item
I of our set of proposals does not require a haircut, but
can only be provided under strict limitation in time and
size, especially ruling out that the boundary of liquidi-
ty help is not trespassed by political initiative.
One might fear that interest mark-ups would actually
translate into a higher, rather than lower, stock of
public debt, since some governments will face higher
borrowing costs. But it is precisely such a possibility
that creates the right incentive for governments to
implement fiscal corrections – ensuring that the deter-
rent effect of higher interest rates dominate over other
considerations. In the negative, this is the important
lesson to be drawn from the experience of countries
like Greece and Portugal, who benefited from the dra-
matic interest rate reductions accompanying the intro-
duction of the euro. These countries had the chance
to contain and reduce their public debt because of the
combined effect of lower interest rates and in part vig-
orous economic booms. But in view of the allure of
the low interest rates, governments (and private
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agents) took on even more credit instead. Only
Ireland reduced its government debt temporarily to a
significant degree, although the fall in explicit govern-
ment debt corresponded to a mounting stock of
implicit public liabilities accumulating in the financial
sector (of course under the presumption that banks
would be rescued).20
VI) Limiting the total amount of guarantees
At any time, the total amount of guarantees and liq-
uidity help must be limited to 30 percent of current
nominal GDP of the aid-seeking country. If a coun-
try exceeds this limit, either because of failure to con-
tain net borrowing (thus enlarging the numerator of
the debt-to-GDP ratio) or because of a drop in eco-
nomic activity (hence reducing its GDP), the ESM
should no longer provide its help. Limiting the stock
of loans and guarantees is necessary as a way to pre-
vent an uncontrolled expansion of the burden for the
guaranteeing countries with possible contagion effects
to the whole euro area. It also serves as a threshold,
the surpassing of which indicates that the country is
in need of deeper and far-reaching measures of debt
restructuring – that is, beyond the debt-reduction
implicit in the CAC. 
VII) Guarantees and liquidity only with collateral or at 
market rates
Guarantees should be granted against insurance pre-
mia at market rates, quoted in CDS prices, for exam-
ple. Specifically, the interest mark-up charged to the
debtor country should be equal to the (GDP-weight-
ed) average interest rate in the euro area during the
months before the state of impending insolvency is
declared. The premium on the guarantees may be
waived if the grantor receives ownership of collateral
in the form of marketable state assets. Similarly, any
liquidity help must come at normal market conditions
for similar risk classes, unless the country offers col-
lateral in exchange. 
2.5.2.3 How the crisis mechanism operates
Building on these basic rules, we propose a multi-step
crisis mechanism. The mechanism is based on the idea
that all the new bonds in the market issued by all EU
countries include CACs of the described type, i.e. with
the possibility of a piecemeal solution to impending
insolvency problems.21 On the one hand, the CAC
bonds make the risk of a haircut in case of threaten-
ing insolvency explicit and structured (de facto, all
bonds bear the risk of a cut, although unorganised).
On the other hand, in case of impending insolvency,
these bonds have the advantage of being exchangeable
for replacement bonds, guaranteed to a considerable
extent (our proposal: 80 percent) by the ESM.
The term “impending insolvency” denotes a state of
acute payment difficulty, which may be overcome, how-
ever, after a limited waiver of claims and with the help
of partially guaranteed replacement bonds. This is to
be distinguished from actual insolvency that has far-
reaching consequences for the independence of the
state and puts the entire government debt outstanding,
no matter its maturity, at the creditor’s disposal. And it
is not the same as a mere liquidity crisis, which does not
pose the question of debt sustainability. 
The following course of the crisis may be imagined
after the CAC securities are in circulation. 
Should a state be unable to service the CAC securities
that are maturing, in the case of doubt it will first be
assumed that it is merely illiquid. The ESM will provide
loans of a limited size and for a limited time to coun-
tries whose debt-to-GDP level is not yet excessive. 
If the loans are insufficient, the time has expired and
the country continues to be unable to service its debt
or the existing debt is already large, an impending
insolvency can be assumed. The country then must
negotiate a haircut with the holders of its outstanding
state bonds. Net of the haircut, the holders of these
bonds can then exchange them for replacement bonds
that are partially secured by the ESM.
Securities of the same issuer, which will not mature
until later, are not involved in this exchange, because
this is what the CACs establish in their bond contract.
The question of whether they are to be serviced in the
regular way or also be converted may be postponed to
their maturity date. 
The haircut can be determined based on the dis-
counts, observable in the market, on the nominal
20 While Ireland even reduced its debt in absolute terms, Spain was
able to substantially reduce it relative to GDP, from 63 percent in
1995 to a low point of 36 percent at the end of 2007.
21 In general, CACs can only be included in newly issued bonds. For
this reason, a diminishing percentage of the bonds in the market over
time have non-CAC status. value of the bond during the whole three-month peri-
od preceding the announcement of negotiations
about restructuring measures subject to maximum
and minimum percentage constraints. This provision
is aimed at preventing turbulence in financial markets.
Since the relevant average for calculating the haircut
covers three months, the discount naturally charged
by markets at any point in time in anticipation of loss-
es during a possible crisis will be self-stabilising with-
in the limits. This should help prevent panic-driven
losses of market values shortly before the expected
restructuring or during the negotiations about
restructuring.
Should the negotiating country find it impossible to
service in time the replacement bonds in accordance
with the contract, it must bring itself, in a final step,
to negotiate an agreement regarding the entire out-
standing debt.
Should it already face difficulties before having issued
the CAC securities, it will be saved by the already
existing rescue system EFSF, limited to three years,
and should be enabled to refinance itself again. 
If difficulties beyond a mere liquidity crisis emerge
after EFSF has expired and if old securities without
CAC clauses become due, the old creditors should be
offered attractive restructuring into replacement
bonds. 
2.5.2.4 The procedure in case of a liquidity crisis 
and/or impending insolvency
For the case of a liquidity crisis or even an impending
insolvency with an exchange of the CAC bonds into
replacement bonds, the crisis procedure by nature fol-
lows the steps outlined below. 
1st step: Liquidity crisis
Suppose a country is unable to service its debt but
claims to face only a liquidity crisis. If this is unani-
mously confirmed by the guarantor states, the ECB
and the IMF, a two-year liquidity help in terms of
senior short-term loans of a maximum maturity of
two years is provided for the debt that needs to be
replaced in this period and for a deficit in line with
what the renewed Stability and Growth Pact allows.
Hopefully the country will again be able to service its
debt after the two years, as it should have raised its
taxes or cut its expenditure sufficiently in the mean-
time. If not, it has to declare an impending insolven-
cy and the second step applies. 
Should the country be liquid again, it may call on the
liquidity help a second time after a break of at least
five years. A country that again becomes illiquid ear-
lier or more than twice in 10 years also has to declare
its impending insolvency. 
A country that claims to be illiquid but has a debt-to-
GDP ratio of more than 120 percent is unlikely to be
merely illiquid. It also has to claim impending insol-
vency. According to this definition Greece, which has
a debt-to-GDP ratio of 140 percent, is already threat-
ened by insolvency and should therefore not receive
the liquidity help. 
2nd step: Market solution in the case of impending 
insolvency
If a country cannot redeem its debt, because it is
threatened by insolvency rather than merely illiquid-
ity, it must negotiate a debt relief programme with
the corresponding creditors of a particular maturity
on the basis of the CAC. Extensions of maturities,
reductions of nominal values or reductions of the
interest rate (coupon) may be the outcome of such
negotiation. During the period of negotiations,
which is not to exceed two months, newly emerging
funding needs for current government activities (pri-
mary and secondary deficits) will be met by the issue
of short-term, maximum one-year, cash advances by
the ESM. The interest rate on these cash advances
will be 5 percentage points above the average interest
rate level of the member countries for loans of the
same duration. The cash advances are also senior to
private credits. 
3rd step: Haircut and issue of replacement bonds
If no agreement can be reached at the second step
between the debtor country and the creditors of the
maturing CAC bond, the third step of the crisis mech-
anism is activated. The negotiation period is again
limited to two months. The funding needs emerging
during the negotiation period will again be met by the
issue of senior cash advances at the interstate level.
Also participating in the negotiations are now rep-
resentatives of the ESM, the ECB and the IMF.
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There will be an automatic haircut on the nominal
value of the redemption amount of the maturing
CAC bond.
The size of the haircut will depend on the average mar-
ket discount of the previous three months before the
start of the negotiations with the creditors. It should,
however, amount to at least 20 percent. A minimum
limit is necessary in order to restrict the chance for
strategic measures on the part of big creditors.22
The maximum limit on the haircut is 50 percent of
the nominal value of the contractually agreed
redemption size of the bond. This limit is to guaran-
tee that, while the market correctly anticipates the
possibility of a crisis occuring, a true panic of the
kind that would ensue if extreme or even total losses
seem possible – is avoided. If the ceiling of the loss-
es is defined and limited, the market may adjust to
the risks in time. 
The par value of bonds net of the haircut will then be
exchanged with replacement bonds on a one-to-one
basis. The replacement bonds in turn will be guaran-
teed by the ESM at 80 percent. The detailed design of
the replacement bond (coupon, duration) is a subject
of the negotiations. 
Of course endangered states and their creditors will
always argue that the risk of market turbulences is
minimal if the haircut approaches zero and the
guarantee of the replacement bonds approaches
100 percent. But in that case the incentives for
opportunistic behaviour on their part would be cor-
respondingly maximised, undermining the stability
of the entire euro system. The conduct of several
European countries and their creditors during the
years of low interest rates, and the European debt
crisis itself, has shown very clearly that the danger
of excessive debt should not be disregarded. Otmar
Issing, the former chief economist of the ECB, has
called the idea that comprehensive insurance pack-
ages would increase the stability of the euro area
“truly grotesque”.23
The optimal balance between the goals of the long-
term political stability of Europe and the short-term
stability of the financial markets consists of neither
eliminating all rescue measures nor setting up com-
prehensive, full-coverage insurance against insolvency
free of deductibles. A maximum haircut of 50 percent
and the partial guarantee of replacement bonds at
80 percent is a meaningful solution for addressing the
trade-off between the two goals. While it imposes a
potential loss on the creditors, it limits this loss to
60 percent of the investment volume. Thus, a limited
interest surcharge is sufficient to compensate investors
for their risk.
If the negotiations between the ESM and the country
threatened by insolvency are unsuccessful, i.e. the
required 75 percent of the bondholders do not agree
to the described exchange into replacement bonds
offered by the debtor country and the Community
states within the negotiation period, the debtor coun-
try on its part must declare a restructuring plan of the
concerned bonds. But in this case the guarantees of
the ESM are inapplicable. 
4th step: Adjustment period
For an adjustment period of up to three years after an
impending insolvency, the ESM may also permit the
debtor country the issuance of partially secured
replacement bonds that are guaranteed at 80 percent
for new net borrowing – as long as the state complies
with the framework of the (new) Stability and Growth
Pact.
The total sum of guarantees granted for the replace-
ment of the outstanding debt and new borrowing (on
a net basis) is limited. As already explained, we con-
sider it appropriate to set this limit at half of the debt-
to-GDP ratio permitted by the Maastricht Treaty, i.e.
at 30 percent of the prior year’s GDP. There will be no
guarantees beyond this limit. 
2.5.2.5 Debt moratorium
The plan described above assumes that a country in
crisis, after issuing partially secured replacement
bonds and receiving a reduction of the creditors’
claims on maturing bonds, will again be able to bor-
row in the financial markets. It could happen, how-
ever, that a state’s guarantee limit of 30 percent of
GDP is insufficient for the country to overcome its
payment difficulties. Or the country may find itself
in a situation in which it is no longer able to service
the replacement bond, requiring the Community
states to step in and pay the guaranteed amount to
the creditors. 
22 For smaller discounts on the market value, the crisis mechanism
might not be activated anyway. 
23 Issing (2010). In that event, the debtor country must declare a debt
moratorium for its entire outstanding government
debt. In this case it can by itself or after negotiations
with its creditors restructure the bonds that are in the
market. Here the ESM no longer offers protection
against losses or risks. 
During an adjustment period of up to three years
after a comprehensive debt moratorium, the ESM can
permit the debtor country to issue replacement bonds,
which are guaranteed at 80 percent, for covering the
current primary deficit (government expenditures –
government receipts). A prerequisite for this is a strict
conditionality within the Stability and Growth Pact. 
2.5.2.6 The threat of insolvency before CAC bonds 
have penetrated the markets
The crisis mechanism described above applies to
bonds that have a CAC. In the transition period
before the new system becomes fully effective, bonds
with and without CAC will coexist in variable
amounts. The question arises therefore of how to deal
with a pending insolvency involving bonds without
CAC. 
As long as the rescue packages currently valid (Greece
and EFSF) are in force, the problem will not arise. But
difficulties may occur in an interim phase, during
which these rescue packages no longer work and the
conversion of the old government debt into CAC
securities has not been completed.
If a country defaults because it is unable to repay debt
that has become due, nothing prevents owners of
standard bonds without CACs that will mature at a
later point in time from calling in their loans prema-
turely, thus exacerbating the crisis and forcing renego-
tiation of the entire debt. With a unanimity require-
ment, however, negotiations would be quite compli-
cated.
Nonetheless the plan already provides a workable
framework for negotiations between the affected cred-
itors and the ESM. Creditors ought to be offered
good terms, in order to reach agreement: it is conceiv-
able that, after a haircut on the order of the market
discount within the above-mentioned limits (at least
20 percent, at most 50 percent), for their remaining
value bonds are exchanged into replacement bonds
that are fully rather than only partially guaranteed by
the ESM. This of course without violating the gener-
al rule that the sum of all guarantees and ESM loans
must not exceed 30 percent of GDP. It is also essential
that the principle that the haircut precedes the aid
should not be given up, even in this, improbable, spe-
cial case. Those who do not accept the thus-specified
aid offer and call in their loans prematurely may try to
recover their claims in court, but receive no guarantee
whatsoever from the ESM.
However, the availability of the CAC bonds combined
with the partially guaranteed replacement bonds has
the possibility to nip a formal default in the bud.
After all, these bonds provide endangered countries
with a financial instrument that should be attractive
to investors, because their maximum potential loss is
limited to 60 percent of the investment volume in even
the worst of all possible cases. Thus, a limited interest
surcharge over safe assets should be sufficient for a
country to be able to find the funds it needs.24 We see
it as one of the main advantages of our proposal that
it offers a ready-to-use solution to the financial prob-
lems currently experienced by a number of euro coun-
tries without jeopardising the prospects of reaching a
viable long-term solution that would permanently sta-
bilise the euro area. In Chapter 3 we indeed suggest
this solution to Greece’s foreseeable financing prob-
lems after 2013. 
While the EU countries agreed in December 2010 to
introduce bonds with CAC clauses in 2013, we suggest
that any euro country should have the right to intro-
duce such bonds before that date, so as to benefit from
the option of converting them into partially guaran-
teed replacement bonds should it be unable to redeem
its debt. One reason for a country to be interested in
such an option is that it may whish to carry out a vol-
untary debt repurchase programme. Market discounts
(see Figure 2.2) for some countries are currently sub-
stantial. Investors may prefer to sell their bonds now
rather than wait to maturity if they fear that the coun-
try may default on these bonds because the advantage
of being exchanged into partially guaranteed replace-
ment bonds is restricted to CAC bonds. 
2.5.2.7 Stabilisation effects
After all old bonds have expired or have been
exchanged into CAC bonds, the crisis mechanism is
fully operative. It will instil more debt discipline and
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will help stabilize the markets. The risk of domino
effects, like those evoked in May 2010 in order to
justify the discretionary rescue programmes
amounting to billions of euros, will be effectively
minimised. Our optimism rests on the following
considerations:
• A strengthening of the Stability and Growth Pact,
along the lines proposed by the Van Rompuy
Commission and largely accepted by the represen-
tatives of the member states, ought to induce at
least some countries to reduce their budget deficits
and outstanding debt. 
• The announcement of the crisis mechanism will
induce investors to continue to demand interest
spreads when buying new government bonds and
to reduce credit granted to less solid countries.
Higher interest rates will discourage deficit spend-
ing and lead to sounder government finances. This
market-driven mechanism will have a stronger
effect than all political debt limits. 
• The protective shields agreed in Washington and
Paris on 11 and 12 October 2008 following the
Lehman bankruptcy of a volume of 4,900 billion
euros remain intact. That alone makes a break-
down of the interbank market like the one that
occurred after the Lehman bankruptcy on
15 September 2008 extremely improbable if not
impossible. In Germany, for example, the SoFFin
(Financial Market Stabilisation Fund) still has
around 50 billion euros of unused capital aid avail-
able for a recapitalisation of the banks. Conditions
are similar in other countries. 
• The fact that a crisis mechanism exists, which in
addition limits the maximum losses, helps banks
and other investors in planning for a country’s pay-
ment crisis. This should limit any possible turbu-
lence in the financial markets. 
• Since, in the third and decisive step of the crisis
mechanism, a haircut is stipulated, which con-
forms to the average market discount during the
last three months preceding the announcement of
restructuring measures, the risk of market turbu-
lence is limited. Whenever the prices threaten to
diverge from the moving average of the last three
months, profitable and stabilising speculation
becomes possible that will push the prices back to
this average. In addition, strategic purchases or
sales will hardly be able to affect the maximum
haircut during the negotiation period. 
• A divergence of interest rates does not necessarily
mean that the banks are losing capital, as in the
normal case the interest rates of states with a good
credit standing will be pushed down and their
bond prices will be pushed up. As shown in
Figure 2.2, this was also the case in the current cri-
sis. Holders of government bonds earned about
twice as much on German and French bonds than
they lost on GIPS bonds. 
Related to the last point, we would like to emphasise
that the haircut is not in itself a destabilising ele-
ment of a crisis mechanism, as is sometimes claimed
by interested parties. According to our proposed
rule, the haircut is engineered such as to exert a sta-
bilising effect, as its size reflects – within the limits
set – the discount on the issue price already realised
in the market. As shown in Figure 2.2, the discounts
on long-term Greek securities amounted to about
30 percent in early November 2010 and also in May
2010. If a haircut had been applied in that month in
such a dimension, no market turbulence would have
been triggered, because the expectations of the mar-
ket agents would have come true. In contrast, a con-
tinuation and expansion of the comprehensive
insurance rescue, which was agreed in May 2010,
would have resulted in a sudden increase of prices,
speculation profits and a considerable destabilisa-
tion of markets. Not only downward swings are
destabilising. Upward swings are destabilising, too,
because they may create opportunities for oppor-
tunistic speculation. 
2.6 Supplementary reforms are needed
The introduction of a crisis mechanism, which defines
the participation of private investors in a possible
restructuring of a euro-area country’s bonds in a cri-
sis situation, must be the core of the reforms of the
body of EU financial rules. In order to be able to
function in the desired way, it should be supplement-
ed by two additional reform measures.
2.6.1 Bank regulation
To date, financial institutions can expect to be rescued
by taxpayers in case of crisis, as their insolvency could
lead to an undesired domino effect on the financial
markets, which would be more costly in the end than
the rescue of an individual institution. It therefore
makes sense for individual banks to incur high risks,
as they can appropriate the high returns in a good
state of the world, leaving the possible losses to tax-
payers. The potential risks of government bonds ofsome south and west European countries may also be
underestimated for the same reason. 
The willingness to assume high risks when buying
government bonds was boosted by the present equity
rules of the Basel system. Accordingly, banks did not
need to consider any risk weight for government
bonds in determining their risk-weighted assets and
therefore did not need reserve equity backing for
them. This was one of the main reasons why banks
invested so heavily in government bonds, and
arguably this was one of the main drivers of the
European sovereign debt crisis. 
In the new Basel III system agreed at the meeting of
the heads of government of the G20 countries in
Seoul, the situation will be improved to the extent that
in future banks must hold equity in relation to the
sum of their risk-weighted assets and on the amount
of 3 percent of their total assets. Since their stocks of
government bonds are part of total assets, there will
be the requirement, for the first time, of equity back-
ing of government bonds held by banks. Yet, the risk
weight of the government bonds in the risk-weighted
assets will, as a rule, still be zero. Only if there is an
extreme downgrading of a country’s credit standing
will higher risk-weights apply, as is already the case
today.
It is appropriate to change the risk weights in such a
way that lending to countries will also be reflected in
the computation of the risk-weighted assets, since in
this case the banks will become more circumspect in
their lending.
Furthermore, it is necessary to develop a rescue sys-
tem, funded by the banks themselves, which will come
to the aid of a distressed bank by providing addition-
al equity in exchange for stock in the case of crisis.
Increasing the equity capital requirements, no matter
how high, remains ineffective as long as evading these
requirements induces policymakers to grant aid mea-
sures in order to prevent a shut-down of the banks
(regulation paradox). In order to make sure that the
equity capital of a bank can truly be liable without the
need to shut down the bank, it is imperative that loss-
es, which push the equity capital below the legal limit,
are met by new outside capital. A bank rescue system
that rescues the banks but not their stockholders
would protect the banking system better against sov-
ereign insolvencies and would thus deflate the argu-
ment that was put forth in the crisis of May 2010 in
favour of the government rescue systems. 
The rescue system can be set up at national level for
banks operating locally. However, transnational banks
that induce inter-country externalities should become
part of international schemes. As the help comes as
equity help in exchange for shares that the fund will
own, the international redistribution would be limited. 
As we have noted earlier (EEAG 2009, Chapter 2), it
would also have been wise for the European Union to
have set up a common system of deposit insurance for
banks with a sufficient scope of international activity,
when the risks to be insured had not yet materialised,
i.e. before the crisis lifted the veil of ignorance. Some of
the problems that, for example, the Irish banking sys-
tem suffered in this crisis could then have been avoided.
The deposit insurance scheme could also have played a
role in restructuring (the US model is the FDIC, whose
role in restructuring banks has been praised). 
Setting up such a scheme after the crisis is difficult
and cannot be justified as insurance because of the
foreseeable redistribution between countries that this
would involve. Nevertheless, when the dust of the cri-
sis has settled and the banking system has been sta-
bilised, a new effort should be made to establish an
actuarially fair deposit insurance system for banks
with truly transnational business. The fees paid by
banks in such a scheme should of course reflect their
risk position according to objective measures. 
Finally, national governments could also help their
respective banks directly, given that no fund has yet
been built up. In Chapter 5, we discuss the potential
design of fees that would be able to provide the neces-
sary revenue. 
2.6.2 Detailing the responsibility of the ECB
Additional supplementary reforms concern the ECB.
The crisis mechanism described above will become
irrelevant if it is undermined by the ECB. By deciding
independently to acquire government bonds, the ECB
made its owners liable to rescue states. Acquiring the
government bonds was not a monetary policy mea-
sure in the true sense, for – as emphasised by the ECB
time and again – it sterilises the effects on the money
supply by liquidity-absorbing actions. As the ECB
even rescinded its earlier announced credit-standing
criteria for repurchase agreements, it in fact is now
pursuing a policy that potentially violates Article 125
TFEU, according to which one country is not liable
for the debts of another country. 
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If the EU countries agree on a crisis mechanism that
aims at the participation of private creditors in the
payment crisis of a member state, the responsibili-
ties of the ECB must also be detailed. In the course
of negotiations about redesigning the EU Treaties, a
change in the distribution of voting rights in accor-
dance with the size of capital shares could be envis-
aged so as to protect the big European guarantor
countries against excessive liability. If policymakers
are not willing to go that far, it is at least necessary
to supplement Article 123 (1) TFEU in such a way
that the ECB may only acquire government bonds
in the secondary market for purposes of monetary
policy.
In this context it is advisable to look closely at the for-
mulation of the relevant Treaty articles: 
“Overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facili-
ty with the European Central Bank or with the central
banks of the Member States (hereinafter referred to
as ‘national central banks’) in favour of Union insti-
tutions, bodies, offices or agencies, central govern-
ments, regional, local or other public authorities,
other bodies governed by public law, or public under-
takings of Member States shall be prohibited, as shall
the purchase directly from them by the European
Central Bank or national central banks of debt
instruments.”25
The formulation clearly states that the ECB may not
grant direct loans to the states and may not directly
acquire government securities. To the layman it
sounds like a general clause that precludes misuse in
the form of funding a government deficit by printing
money. Purchases on the secondary market are not
precluded, however. The fact that Greece sold its gov-
ernment bonds to its central bank using the detour via
its commercial banks was permitted because it was
not prohibited. 
To be sure, such purchases may be necessary in given
situations to fight a general deflation in the euro area,
which is more than merely a remote possibility, as the
Japanese example shows. This applies especially if the
interest floor of 0 percent has been reached and there
is still a direct risk of deflation, measured by the
Harmonised Consumer Price Index for the entire euro
area. But the ECB should not forget its credit-stand-
ing criteria, nor should it try to protect government
budgets. Therefore, for a future amendment of the
Treaty the last sentence of the cited paragraph should
be supplemented with this proviso: 
“The indirect purchase of government bonds is limit-
ed to securities of high creditworthiness and exclu-
sively permitted for purposes of monetary policy.”
In light of our proposal, there is already a lender of
last resort providing liquidity help to states; relieving
the ECB from responsibilities that are not appropriate
for monetary authorities to bear is advisable. 
An important issue is whether the ECB should
nonetheless play a role in maintaining financial stabil-
ity for the euro system as a whole. Technically, it
makes sense for a central bank to provide liquidity
support to financial intermediaries, according to
sound principles, as discussed in a previous EEAG
report (EEAG 2009, Chapter 2). Yet, in view of the
fiscal implications of financial crises, discretion in the
provision of liquidity help may be subject to undue
political influence, creating a hidden channel of fiscal
transfers in contradiction to the goals of the new
European fiscal governance system. As the German
experience of the early 1920s has shown, direct or
indirect access of governments to central bank money
would also risk financing government budget deficits
with newly issued money, which could result in hyper-
inflation. Thus we consider it essential to limit such
central bank policy strictly to the exceptional purpose
of fighting a deflationary risk. 
2.7 Concluding remarks
There were good reasons for the founders of the
European Monetary Union to include a no-bailout
clause in the Treaty. It basically means that the mem-
ber countries must deal with their fiscal problems
themselves and must not expect the help of neigh-
bouring countries and their taxpayers. Knowing this,
investors would require a higher risk premium of
weaker debtors than for economically stable coun-
tries, which would then prevent excessive borrowing,
mispricing and bubbles in the euro area. So the idea. 
Past events have shown, however, that the no-bailout
clause was not sufficiently credible, and that mispric-
ing and bubbles occurred nevertheless. This was due
to the fact that systemically important banks could
expect to be rescued by their states, and the states in
turn by the community of member states, to avoid
panic reactions and domino effects. Obviously there
25 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU), Article 123, Section 1.was speculation that in case of crisis enough pressure
would be built up to induce the EU countries to pro-
vide help, even though they were violating the EU
Treaty in doing so. 
The problematic moral hazard effects that were creat-
ed by the lack of credibility of the no-bailout clause
was enhanced by the Basel system’s deficiency of not
requiring banks to hold any regulatory equity capital
against government bonds. This deficiency is a major
explanation of why French, and to some extent also
German, banks were so heavily exposed to govern-
ment bonds in this crisis and why they exerted suffi-
cient pressure on their governments to agree on the
rescue measures of May 2010. 
The situation was exacerbated further in that the
Stability and Growth Pact was never taken seriously.
New borrowing by the European countries has
exceeded the 3 percent ceiling of the Stability and
Growth Pact 97 times. Only in 29 cases could the high
deficits be justified by the exemptions provided in the
Pact. In 68 cases, sanctions should have been
imposed, but in fact, they never were. The rules devel-
oped by the European Union to harness government
debt proved to be utterly ineffective.
For these reasons, in the initial period under the
European Monetary Union, Europe was charac-
terised by what Hungarian economist Janós Kornai
once called “soft budget constraints” in making his
famous prediction that Communism was doomed to
fail. Soft budget constraints always lead to disaster.
Although in the present crisis it was not the fall of the
entire system, it was a crisis severe enough to threaten
confidence in the future of the European Union. 
In economic terms the soft budget constraints operat-
ed via a rapid interest rate convergence relative to pre-
euro times. Before the introduction of the euro there
were huge interest spreads, much bigger than today, to
compensate for a perceived depreciation risk. With the
launch of the euro, the implicit bailout expectations
eliminated these spreads, inducing huge and unprece-
dented capital flows in Europe. The capital basically
flowed out of Germany, which became the world’s sec-
ond largest capital exporter after China, and into the
countries of Europe’s south and western periphery,
creating an overheated boom in the periphery and a
severe slump in Germany. While in Germany the net
investment share in output was pushed to the lowest
level in the OECD, real estate prices declined and
growth fell to the second lowest level in Europe, the
countries in the periphery experienced a housing
boom with unprecedented GDP growth rates. 
As a result of the slump, Germany’s imports grew
only little and its product prices stagnated, improving
the competitiveness of German exports. Similarly, in
the booming countries imports grew quickly, while
exports were constrained by rapid price increases that
undermined these countries’ competitiveness. Via
these mechanisms, trade imbalances developed that
were large enough to match the capital flows induced
by the euro from Germany to the countries in the
periphery. As Christine Lagarde pointed out so right-
ly, EU countries were dancing the tango, but the
music was coming from the capital rather than the
goods markets. 
The capital flows and the resulting trade flows even-
tually became excessive and unsustainable, triggering
a bursting of real estate bubbles and the sovereign
debt crisis Europe is now suffering. 
Debt discipline only came into effect when, well into
the global crisis, financial markets started to charge
sizeable interest rates according to the different credit
standing of each country. Only then did financial
markets activate the debt brake that had been lacking
in Europe for private and public debtors. Too late, one
may argue.
For this reason alone, no crisis mechanism should be
demanded for Europe that eliminates interest spreads
again (as happened in the first years of the euro). In
particular, the euro area should under no circum-
stances adopt eurobonds or similarly constructed
community loans, as have been advocated by some
European politicians. We can only warn that taking
the direction of issuing such bonds will exacerbate the
problems we see at the root of the crisis. Eurobonds
will do nothing but strengthen incentives for oppor-
tunistic behaviour on the part of debtors and credi-
tors, given that they prevent the emergence of funda-
mental risk premia by acting as full-coverage insur-
ance against insolvency. Appropriate pricing of sover-
eign risk is an essential feature of well-functioning
financial markets and this excludes joint liability
mechanisms. It induces debtors and creditors not to
exaggerate the capital flows and to exercise caution in
lending. This is the essential prerequisite of removing
the European trade imbalances in the future. Those
who want to force artificially a convergence of nomi-
nal interest rates across government bonds by political
measures, in spite of different probabilities of
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redemption, de facto argue in favour of cross-subsi-
dising the flow of capital into relatively unsafe coun-
tries. They advocate a policy that would again expose
the euro area to periods of relative overheating of the
countries with more fragile fiscal and financial foun-
dations, and relative stagnation in the countries with
better discipline, which would perpetuate the trade
imbalances. 
We do not want to be misunderstood, however. We
argue neither against the provision of emergency
liquidity to address panics, nor against rescue mea-
sures to help countries in pursuing their restructur-
ing needs. In our proposal, the mandatory inclusion
of collective action clauses (CAC) in all bonds sold
by euro-area governments together with the provi-
sion of replacement bonds, guaranteed to 80 per-
cent by the Community states and available in case
of emergency, will grant considerable protection.
The availability of these bonds will allow GIPS
countries (or any country facing a looming crisis) to
service existing bonds sequentially, as they come due
at maturity, by the sale of bonds with CAC and in
all likelihood to avoid insolvency. We warn against
establishing a full-coverage insurance against insol-
vency, however, as some EU politicians are appar-
ently contemplating. 
The CAC bonds, backed by partially guaranteed
replacement bonds, provide a possibility for troubled
European countries to address their financing needs
immediately. As these bonds define and limit the risk
to investors, they provide a key instrument for coun-
tries to raise money from the market without having
to resort to the funds of the ESM. For instance,  issu-
ing these bonds can make it possible for these coun-
tries to repurchase debt at today’s discounted market
values, with the goal of significantly reducing their
debt-to-GDP ratios.
For countries that nevertheless face difficulties, we
propose a three-stage crisis mechanism that distin-
guishes between illiquidity, impending insolvency and
(full) insolvency. We place most emphasis on the sec-
ond of these concepts, because it is a breakwater pro-
cedure that seeks to avoid full insolvency. 
First, if a country cannot service its debt, a mere liq-
uidity crisis will be assumed, i.e. a temporary difficul-
ty due to a surge of mistrust in markets that will soon
be overcome. The European Stability Mechanism
(ESM) helps overcome a liquidity crisis by providing
short-term loans, senior to private loans given to gov-
ernments, for a maximum of two years in a row. This
time period should be long enough for the country to
raise its taxes or cut its expenditures so as to convince
private creditors to resume lending.
Second, if the payment difficulties persist after the
two-year period, an impending insolvency is to be
assumed. The ESM now provides help in terms of
partially guaranteeing the replacement bonds that the
country can offer the creditors whose claims become
due, but only under the condition of a haircut for the
respective loan maturities. The haircut will see to it
that the banks and other owners of government
bonds bear part of the risk of their investments. As
the haircut will, within limits, be sized on the basis of
the discounts already priced in by investors, it will
clearly help stabilising markets. Providing financial
resources from the community of euro states to
investors, without ensuring a haircut as a precondi-
tion, in the amount of the actual discounts priced by
markets, would be tantamount to shoving profits onto
the speculators.
Third, should the country be unable to service the
replacement bonds and need to draw on the guaran-
tees from the ESM, full insolvency must be declared
for the entire outstanding government debt. 
The key prerequisite for maintaining the market disci-
pline ensured by correct interest spreads (and for
allowing capital markets to allocate aggregate savings
efficiently) is the sequencing and relative size of the
haircut and government aid in the case of impending
insolvency. Before financial aid in the form of guar-
anteed replacement bonds may be granted, the credi-
tors must initially offer a partial waiver of their
claims. Only this order of events (with defined maxi-
mum losses for the investors) can guarantee that the
creditors apply caution when granting loans and
demand interest mark-ups. 
There are reasons to hope that future crises of the
euro area will not be as severe as the current one,
given that some of the initially huge differences
between the European economies have been reduced
in the first decade of the euro. Despite their excesses,
the recent capital flows within the euro area have
indeed fostered the catching-up process in lagging
countries. Because of the reduced distance, and the
emergence of country risk in financial markets, the
catching-up process within the euro area can be
expected to be much slower in the future. At the same
time, the crisis will necessarily cause real exchangerate realignment, leading to a sustained rebalancing
of trade and capital flows. 
Nevertheless, the crisis has revealed severe deficiencies
in the Maastricht Treaty and has now paved the way
for a new economic governance system, ensuring the
long-run stability of the euro area. The new system
must address the core issue of complementarity
between surveillance, supervision and regulation, on
the one hand, and market discipline, on the other. The
main mistake of the past, undermining the second pil-
lar, should not be repeated.
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